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1. Introduction 
 
Since the mid-90s Spain has undergone intense urbanization. The country’s cities have 
sprawled, resulting in a pattern of discontinuous, low-density urban development. 
According to data from the Spanish Ministry of Housing, some 600,000 dwellings per 
year were initiated between 1996 and 2005, a figure that almost doubled annual 
domestic demand for new homes1. Moreover, most of this building activity took the 
form of scattered, spatially-expansive urban growth. Consequently, between 1987 and 
2005 the proportion of artificial land rose by 54.86%, reflecting primarily the 
expansion in land for new infrastructure and developments located at the urban fringe2. 
Yet, marked differences are evident in the spatial distribution of this growth across the 
country, with it being particularly intense in Mediterranean coastal areas (i.e., in the 
tourist zones of Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia and the Balearic Islands that 
had not been developed in the 80s, which grew, on average, by 50% during this period) 
and within the urban area of Madrid, where dispersed residential land grew, on average, 
by 25%3.  
 
Initially population growth was considered the main cause of sprawl, as cities needed to 
expand to accommodate new residents. However, over the last 20 years only moderate 
increases in population have been accompanied by a sizeable expansion of urban 
areas4, suggesting that factors other than population growth are more likely to be 
driving the process today. Individual housing preferences combined with higher 
income levels, the reduction in transport costs and the improvement in road networks 
ensure that the demand for land at the urban fringe is in a constant state of growth 
(Mieskowski and Mills, 1993; Brueckner and Fansler, 1983; McGrath, 2005). 
Moreover, high levels of political fragmentation (Carruthers, 2002; Carruthers and 
                                                 
1  Between 1996 and 2006 dwellings for about 16 million people were initiated in Spain 
(considering 2.84 residents per household), while the population grew by only 5.5 million 
people (Spanish Ministry of Housing and National Statistics Institute).  
2Data provided by the Corine Land Cover Project (1990, 2000 and 2006), Spanish Ministry of 
Public Works. 
3 The increase in the proportion of developed land along the Mediterranean coast is basically 
the result of an increase in demand for second homes, while within the urban area of Madrid it 
reflects an increase in the mobility of the city’s residents, attracted by lower housing prices, and 
with a preference for single detached homes and for the higher environmental quality of life 
available in areas surrounding the main city.    
4 As data from the European Environmental Agency (EEA, 2006) show, during this period 
population has grown by only 6 percent while built-up areas increased by 20 percent. 
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Ulfarsson, 2002) and competition between municipalities have also been instrumental 
(EEA, 2006)5. 
 
In Spain, however, various additional factors may be considered determinants of this 
change in land use: first, an economic growth model based on sectors with intense 
land-consumption demands, including construction, transport and tourism; second, the 
increasing foreign and domestic demand for second homes, motivated by rising  
income levels together with favourable mortgages and low interest rates 6 , and 
encouraged by increasing speculation in the housing market (representing nearly one 
third of total housing demand); third, the considerable investment in public transport 
and infrastructure undertaken by public authorities over the last two decades; and, 
fourth, poorly defined land-use regulations together with the absence of control and 
intergovernmental coordination on matters relating to urban planning, which has given 
local authorities plenty of room to manoeuvre in their urban growth decision-making. 
Indeed, a number of studies recognise that the absence of region-wide cooperation and 
weak centralised urban planning policies result in excessive city growth (see, e.g., 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002). Finally, certain public subsidy and investment 
policies, in particular those whose design implies the allocation of resources according 
to the infrastructure deficit generated by population growth, seem to have fostered 
sprawl7. 
 
Urban sprawl can have several desirable outcomes ranging from the fulfilment of 
residents’ preferences for larger, single-family detached housing and greater proximity 
to open spaces, to segregation from some of the problems that blight the inner city, 
such as pollution, crime and congestion. Despite its attractions, sprawl has been blamed 
for the social costs it incurs for an urban area, including traffic congestion, air 
                                                 
5 Brueckner (2000, 2001), Brueckner and Kim (2003), Burchfield et al (2006), Burchell et al 
(1998, 2002), Glaeser and Khan (2004) and Nechyba and Walsh (2004), among others, also 
offer an explanation of the many factors that might be considered the driving force behind this 
phenomenon. 
6 Between 1990 and 2000 the number of second homes increased by 40%, as a percentage of 
total homes (Housing and Population Census, National Institute of Statistics). 
7 In Spain, land-use regulatory responsibilities are shared by different levels of government. The 
central government establishes the land-use regulation benchmark (as regards the protection of 
areas designated “non-developable”), while regional governments are responsible for passing 
municipal land-use plans. In practice, local authorities enjoy considerable freedom in 
determining a municipality’s urban planning. During the 90s, increasing the land supply was 
deemed to be the remedy for excessively high housing prices, and so successive land-use 
reforms focused on facilitating the conversion of land from rural to urban uses (Fernández, 
2008; Bilbao et al., 2006). 
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pollution, social segregation, loss of farmland and a reduction in open-space amenities, 
among others8. Consequently, the intensity and the impact of recent, rapid land-use 
change mean urban sprawl has become a contentious and widely-debated topic among 
academics, urban planners and the general public9. Specifically, one of the main costs 
of this phenomenon has been identified as the impact of sprawl on local public finance. 
This spatially expansive and low-density growth increases the provision costs of local 
public services, including refuse collection, police and fire protection, public transport 
and road cleaning services, given that sprawl tends to undermine scale economies and 
increase costs inefficiently (Carruthers, 2002; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003, 2008). 
Spatially expansive development patterns are also associated with higher costs because 
of the considerable levels of investment required to extend basic infrastructure (roads, 
sewerage, electricity) over greater distances so as to reach relatively smaller numbers of 
residents (Carruthers, 2002). Yet, this new urban development pattern also seems to be 
a source of potential funds for Spain’s local governments, in terms of revenues 
associated with building activity and increased grants from upper tiers of governments. 
Moreover, in the case of Spain, urban developers are under the obligation to hand over 
a portion of newly developed land to the municipality (Aguinaga, 2002; Fernández, 
2008, Maldonado and Suárez-Pandiello, 2008). According to the data available, 
development revenues (i.e., planning permits, construction taxes, taxes on land value 
improvements, public land sales and asset revenues) grew considerably over the period 
1994-2005, increasing their weight within total non-financial revenues by 10%10. As a 
result, these revenues have displaced the property tax and become the main and most 
attractive source of finance for local governments11. Additionally, the limited capacity 
of local management to obtain and handle resources means many municipalities face 
                                                 
8 See Brueckner (2000, 2001), Downs (1999), Ewing (1997) Glaeser and Khan (2004) and 
Sierra Club (1998) for a review of the consequences of sprawl. 
9 See, for instance, EEA (2006), European Parliament (2009), Greenpeace España (2009). This 
relevance has also been recognized in press, i.e. the articles “La costa es ya un cementerio de 
hormigón” (El País 27/07/2009) and “El satélite que divisó el ladrillo” (El País 13/04/05).   
10 Note that neither the tax on land value improvements nor the construction tax is likely to be 
justified from an economic point of view. However, as explained in Slack (2006) and Bird and 
Slack (1991), local governments levy development charges to cover the growth-related costs 
associated with new development. These charges provide the municipality with revenues to 
finance the infrastructure needs arising from this growth. Therefore, the existence of such 
charges is justified on the ground that growth should pay for itself rather than being a burden 
for existing taxpayers.  See also Brueckner (2001) for further details on the internalisation of the 
full costs generated by new developers. 
11 See Pou (2007) and the article “Las grandes ciudades españolas apoyan sus ingresos en el 
negocio urbanístico” (Expansión 22/05/2007). 
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financial difficulties as they strive to satisfy their residents’ demands. This being the 
case, sprawl can be a good funding instrument for municipal authorities12.  
 
In the light of the above, it might be concluded that as land-use changes occur, the 
balance of municipal revenues and expenditures changes as well. Given this 
relationship, local authorities need to be aware of the long-term financial implications 
of their land-use decisions and the need to re-examine the role played by state and 
regional governments in regulating the outcome of this growth pattern. Thus, this paper 
seeks to provide evidence regarding the net fiscal impact of sprawl on local public 
finance. The availability of disaggregated budget data at the local level for 4,000 
Spanish municipalities for the period 1994-2005 allows a dynamic analysis to be 
undertaken, based on the estimation of a panel vector autoregressive model. We first 
explore how sprawl interacts with local budgets by breaking the non-financial deficit 
down into several components: current spending, tax revenues, current transfers, capital 
spending, capital transfers and development revenues. Unobserved individual effects 
and a set of time dummies are included in all the regressions. The estimation procedure 
relies on the application of GMM techniques in order to ensure consistent and efficient 
estimates. Having been correctly specified, the model allows the Generalised Impulse 
Response Functions to be computed, so as to determine the way in which municipal 
budgets adjust to an urban sprawl shock and the role that is played by upper tiers of 
government in this process. Overall, with these findings we seek to contribute to the 
existing empirical literature on the consequences of sprawl, as well as orienting public 
policy in terms of its local land-use decision-making.  
 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief 
overview of the empirical literature analysing the fiscal impact and the dynamics of 
municipal finances. In the third section we outline the analytical framework. The fourth 
section describes the methodology and the data used in carrying out the empirical 
analysis, and discusses the main results. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 In fact, a preliminary analysis of the data showed that localities facing higher financial burden 
and lower net savings in the early 90s fuelled urban expansion more intensely than did those 
without such financial problems.  
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2. Previous literature  
 
A review of the literature indicates that the research question raised here has not 
been previously addressed. The most similar studies are perhaps those that undertake 
fiscal impact analyses - a method that estimates the likely cost-revenue impact of a 
particular land-use development pattern based upon recent experiences in a given 
location. This tool was standardized by Burchell and Listokin (1978) and has 
subsequently been widely adopted by local policy-makers in making their land-use 
decisions13. Drawing on these methods, analysts determine the net difference between 
the public expenditures that is likely to be incurred when providing roads and other 
services to a new urban development and the corresponding revenues. They also 
examine the fiscal impact of alternative development scenarios (e.g., testing different 
densities or spatial patterns). 
 
However, only a handful of studies have used cost functions derived from cross-section 
regression analyses to determine the impact of either population growth (Ladd, 1992, 
1994) or alternative residential developments (Carruthers, 2002; Carruthers and 
Ulfarsson, 2003, 2008; Heikkila and Craig, 1991; Kelsey, 1996; Bunnell, 1998;) on the 
fiscal position of local governments. For the Spanish case, only Hortas-Rico and Solé-
Ollé (2010) have analyzed the impact of this urban development pattern on the 
provision costs of certain local public services. They provide evidence of the positive 
and non-linear impact of low-density development patterns on the provision costs of 
various local public services. In particular, their results suggest that in municipalities 
with a spatially expansive urban development pattern, the provision costs of public 
services increase initially as a result of rising road construction costs and general 
administration costs, and then, as the urban sprawl advances, costs continue to rise as a 
result of increasing expenditure in the provision of community facilities, housing, local 
police and culture.  
 
As noted above, however, an impact on local revenues can also be expected, and as 
such the net fiscal impact on local budgets remains undetermined. Any analysis of the 
impact of sprawl on local budgets should be undertaken using a dynamic panel data 
approach, since the effect on expenditures and revenues might present a different time 
profile. The typical way to proceed involves examining the intertemporal linkages 
                                                 
13 See Kotchen and Schulte (2009) for further details. 
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between the variables of interest. This implies analysing vector autoregressive models 
in a panel data framework, combining the tools that are typically adopted in a time 
series context with the techniques applied to panel data models.  
 
A few empirical studies have been undertaken with a sole focus on the intertemporal 
linkages of a local budget. The first to address this issue was Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), 
in which the authors described an instrumental variables technique to estimate and test 
panel vector autoregression models with unobserved heterogeneity. Subsequently, 
several authors have implemented this technique in analysing local government 
behaviour. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989), Dahlberg and Johansson (1998, 2000), Moisio 
and Kangasharju (1997) and Moisio (2000), using US, Swedish and Finnish municipal 
data, respectively, provide evidence of significant intertemporal linkages over a short-
time period between budget variables. In the case of Spain, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas 
(2009), in line with a few other papers (Buettner and Wildasin, 2006; Buettner, 2007), 
examine whether local government budgets undergo any adjustments following a 
budget shock, focusing on the role played by intergovernmental grants in this process. 
The paper, therefore, adopts the same theoretical framework, but addresses a quite 
distinct question regarding the dynamic relationship between local budgets and urban 
sprawl. Moreover, here we work with richer data, in terms of both the number of 
locations included in the sample and the level of disaggregation of the budget data.  
 
3. The Spanish Municipal Sector: an overview. 
 
Spain is a decentralized country composed of three different levels of 
government: the central government, 17 regional governments named Autonomous 
Communities and about 8,000 local governments. The latter are characterized by their 
high degree of fragmentation (about 60% of existing municipalities have fewer than 
1,000 inhabitants and represent just 5% of the total population), which implies a 
structure of many independent units of government with very small populations, and 
limited public resources and management capacity. Table 1 summarizes the 
composition and evolution of local budgets in Spain during the period considered in the 
present study. 
 
The expenditure side. In Spain, the responsibilities assumed by local government are 
distributed in accordance with a population headcount, i.e., national legislation 
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establishes the services that municipalities must provide their residents according to 
their size. The public provision of basic services (refuse collection, street cleaning, 
water supply, sewer system and street lighting, among others) is compulsory for all 
municipalities. Then, as the population rises, a number of other responsibilities have to 
be assumed: parks, public libraries, solid waste treatment, local police, social services, 
public transport and environmental protection. In practice, municipalities tend to 
provide more services than are actually required by law so as to satisfy residents’ 
demands. Note, however, that the list of responsibilities assumed by Spain’s local 
governments is limited to very traditional functions performed elsewhere and does not 
extend to include services that consume large amounts of resources, such as education, 
health or social services. 
 
The revenue side. The local provision of these public services is financed primarily 
from local taxes (which include the property tax, local business tax and local motor 
vehicle tax) and the non ear-marked grants that local governments receive from upper 
levels of government. In fact, direct taxes, user charges and current transfers account 
for more than 60 percent of total municipal revenues (see Table 1). 
 
Yet, the limited management capacity of local government to obtain and handle 
resources means that many municipalities face financial difficulties when trying to 
meet their expenditure needs. On the one hand, Spanish local governments are able to 
modify the tax rates of all the taxes assigned to them, albeit subject to compulsory 
minimum tax rates and ceilings set by the central authority. However, the main local 
taxes (property tax, business tax and motor vehicle tax) have fairly inelastic tax bases 
and are considered inequitable and, as such, are somewhat unpopular, impeding 
municipalities from making any short-term adjustments. On the other hand, local debt 
is limited since 2001 by compliance to the Budget Stability Law. Thus, a number of 
local governments maintain the investment levels required to satisfy their residents’ 
demands by relying either on immediate financing derived from urban expansion or on 
transfers from upper tiers of government14.  
                                                 
14 Note that grant financing has several associated perils, in terms of moral hazard problems (so 
that local governments, aware that intergovernmental grants insure against budget shocks, tend 
to implement overly risky policies), incentives to soften budget constraints (providing in their 
turn incentives to run up excessive local deficits which authorities assume will be covered by 
future grants), the diffusion of accountability or the stimulation of rent-seeking and clientelism 
(see Devarajan et al., 2009, and Persson and Tabellini, 1997, for more comprehensive 
explanations). 
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 However, it would appear that the decision to depend on building activity as a source of 
finance is not a consequence of the failure of other fiscal sources to generate revenues 
but a local political option. In other words, municipal authorities have not reached their 
tax autonomy ceiling as determined by other taxes but rather they have opted to 
increase their dependence on immediately significant and less unpopular revenues 
linked to the real estate cycle.  
 
Table 1. Municipal budgets in Spain, 1994-2006 (%) 
  1994 2005 
(a) Local Non-financial Expenditures 
Current Expenditure:   
I. Wages and salaries  30.41% 29.93% 
II. Purchases of goods and services 24.36% 30.14% 
III. Debt service 6.92% 1.51% 
IV. Current grants 6.07% 7.47% 
Capital Expenditure:   
VI. Real investment 17.17% 23.03% 
VII. Capital grants 2.07% 2.73% 
Total 87.01% 94.82% 
   
(b) Local Non-financial Revenues 
   
Current Revenue:   
I. Direct taxes 27.20% 26.69% 
 Property taxes 13.96% 15.23% 
 Motor vehicle taxes 4.46% 4.61% 
 Tax on land value improvements 1.84% 3.05% 
 Business taxes 6.60% 3.01% 
II. Indirect taxes 2.58% 5.53% 
 Construction taxes 2.55% 4.65% 
III. User charges (includes planning permissions) 16.19% 17.56% 
IV. Current transfers 27.69% 26.50% 
V. Asset revenues 2.06% 2.36% 
Capital Revenue:   
VI. Real investment sales (includes public land sales) 2.12% 6.42% 
VII. Capital transfers 6.02% 7.31% 
Total 83.87% 92.37% 
   
Development revenues  14.2% 23.5% 
Notes: (i) Economic classification of Spanish municipal budgets by sections. (ii) 
Development revenues include taxes on land value improvements, construction taxes, 
planning permits, asset revenues and public land sales. 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Economy. 
 
As a result, more volatile sources of revenue have replaced the property tax as the main 
source of municipal finance. As can also be seen in Table 1, development revenues 
have increased considerably over the past fifteen years, almost doubling their share 
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within local non-financial revenues. The same can be said of intergovernmental capital 
grants, the role of which has also been enhanced as a source of municipal revenues over 
the period considered15.  
 
4. Econometric model and estimation method 
 
As stated above, the aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamic relationship 
between public finance and urban sprawl at the municipal level. A vector 
autoregressive methodology is suited to this purpose given the absence of an a priori 
theory regarding the relationship between the variables in the model 16 . The 
methodology is based on a framework that allows all variables to be considered as 
endogenous within a system of equations, in which the short-run dynamic relationships 
can subsequently be identified (Lutkephol, 2005)17. 
Thus, the model for testing this hypothesis is very similar to that adopted in Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1989) and in Dahlberg and Johansson (1998, 2000) for analyzing the 
intertemporal linkages between local budget variables. According to these papers and 
assuming endogenous urban sprawl, the reduced form of a panel vector autoregressive 
model can be expressed, using matrix notation, as follows: 
 
                                     itX =
X
t0α +∑
=
−
p
j
jti
X
j X
1
,φ + Xif  + Xitu                                                     (1) 
 
                                                 
15 In Spain, nearly all current transfers originating from central government are non-earmarked 
(primarily the Revenues Sharing Grant), while most current transfers from the ACs are ear-
marked (transfers for which each municipality must apply in order to access funding). Besides, 
capital transfers are ear-marked grants that mainly finance capital expenditure projects proposed 
by local governments. Since no general funds are provided in Spain to pay for facilities and 
infrastructures, the ACs have set up Local Works Programs. Their goal is to co-operate in the 
provision of facilities and services that are of municipal competence. The municipality needs to 
present a project in response to a regular invitation and, if accepted, the grantor covers a 
proportion of the project’s costs. The allocation of these funds is highly discretional on the part 
of the grantor, and they usually serve to compensate communities in financial trouble, 
especially the small ones, whose expertise and technical capability is sometimes limited.  
16 As noted in Greene (2006), VARs are not just the reduced form of a structural model, since 
researchers report that simple, small-scale VARs without a possibly flawed theoretical 
foundation have proved as good as, or better than, large-scale structural equation systems.  
17  Note that a cross-sectional analysis only captures the contemporaneous impact of the 
variables, while working with panel data allows the researcher to investigate the dynamics of 
the process, as it considers both inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics. 
Moreover, dynamic panel data models, in which lagged values of the dependent variables are 
included as regressors, also take into account the short-run reactions of the variables included in 
the model. 
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where Xit=(CDit, KDit, sprawlit)’ is the vector of jointly determined dependent variables, 
in which sprawlit denotes the urban sprawl measure and CDit and KDit are current and 
capital non-financial deficit respectively. The subscripts i denote cross-sectional units 
(municipalities), i = 1, …,N, subscripts t time periods, t = (p+1), …,T, and p the lag 
length. α0t is the time dummy, included in the model to account for common shocks 
that affect all municipalities in the same way18, jφ  is the m x m coefficient matrix, 
where m is the number of endogenous variables, fi is the unobserved heterogeneity or 
individual effect that controls for municipal specific characteristics and uit is the 
idiosyncratic error, assumed to be white noise and independent across individuals19. 
 
In order to disentangle the adjustments made by the various budget components 
to an urban sprawl shock, we present an extended specification of the model given by 
expression (1), by disaggregating each component of the non-financial deficit. 
Let the non-financial deficit (NFDit) be defined by the following expression: 
  
             NFDit = CDit – KDit = (CEit – TXit – CTit) – (KEit – KTit – DRit)                     (2) 
 
where CEit denotes current expenditures, TXit tax revenues, CTit current transfers, KEit 
capital expenditures, KTit  capital transfers and DRit development revenues20. 
According to (2), the model given by (1) can be reconsidered so that the following 
model can be specified: 
                                           itW =
W
t0α +∑
=
−
p
j
jti
W
j W
1
,φ + Wif  + Witu                                                  (3) 
where Wit=(CEit, TXit, CTit, KEit, KTit, DRit, sprawlit)’. 
 
                                                 
18  The inclusion of year-fixed effects in the specification should control for all common 
innovations in municipalities and, hence, estimation results should only capture how 
idiosyncratic shocks on sprawl affect the budget variables of the system. This could be a 
problem if the sprawl shocks were common to all municipalities. However, we do believe this is 
not the case, since a preliminary analysis of the data shows that the sprawl impact differs 
according to localities. 
19 In the reduced form all right-hand side variables are predetermined at time t. As there are no 
time t endogenous variables included as regressors, any variable has a direct contemporaneous 
effect on the other variables of the system. However, since the vector of innovations may be 
contemporaneously correlated, a shock to an equation affects all other endogenous variables in 
time t, as is shown when computing the Generalised Impulse Response Functions. 
20 The composition of each of these variables is explained in the Data Section. See the previous 
section for further details on the Development Revenues variable. 
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Therefore, the model given by expression (3) disaggregates the non-financial deficit 
into six different components (CEit, TXit , CTit, KEit, KTit and DRit). The breaking down 
of the two non-financial deficit components allows us to investigate in detail how both 
the current and capital deficits adjust to an urban sprawl shock. In other words, we are 
able to see whether an increase (decrease) in the current deficit resulting from a sprawl 
shock is attributable to an increase (decrease) in current spending or a decrease 
(increase) in tax revenues or current transfers. Likewise, an increase (decrease) in the 
capital deficit might respond to an increase (decrease) in capital spending or 
alternatively to a decrease (increase) in capital transfers or the revenues associated with 
building. 
 
4.1. Econometric procedure 
 
Omitting fi from the above regressions results in inconsistent estimates, since it 
correlates with the right-hand side variables. In this context, a common way to proceed 
is to get rid of the fixed effect by taking the first differences in the above model. Since 
uit is white noise, this transformation introduces a first-order moving average process in 
the new residual term that creates an endogeneity problem in the equation. Thus, an 
instrumental variable approach has to be applied so as to ensure consistent estimates21. 
The orthogonality conditions satisfied by uit can be used to identify the parameters of 
the model, given that Δuit is uncorrelated with Xi,t-1 for s ≥ 2. Hence, the values of 
lagged variables can be used to define the matrix of possible instruments for the 
equations in first differences, say Zit, so that [ ] 0=Δ itit uZE   and [ ] 0≠Δ itit uXE . 
Provided that this is an overidentified case, efficiency requires that we use all available 
instruments by means of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) rather than a 
simple Instrumental Variables (IV) or Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach22. In 
the case of fixed-effect dynamic panel data with a large cross-section observed over a 
short time period, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) developed 
an estimator that uses all available lagged values of the variables in levels at each time 
                                                 
21 In micro panel data models, i.e. large N and short T, where lagged dependent variables are 
included as regressors, the within groups estimator gives inconsistent estimates (Nickell, 1981). 
Besides, applying pooled OLS, which omits the unobserved heterogeneity, would be 
inconsistent as well. 
22 The IV estimator, proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), uses values of the variables in 
levels or in differences lagged two periods as instruments. This procedure leads to consistent but 
inefficient estimates, since not all moment conditions are used and the serial correlation 
structure in the residuals is not taken into account.  
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period as instruments in the first-differenced equation. But, as noted in Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), the lagged values of the dependent 
variable may be weak instruments for the first differences when the series is 
particularly persistent, i.e. when the variables are close to a random walk. In this case, 
it is better to implement the system-GMM estimator in order to avoid possible biases. 
This estimator combines the moment conditions for the equations in first differences 
with additional moment conditions for the equations in levels. In particular, under the 
additional assumption that past changes of the instrumented variables are orthogonal to 
the current error term in levels, it is possible to use instruments in levels for the first-
differenced equations and first-differenced instruments for the equations in levels 
(Arellano, 2003; Roodman, 2007, 2008).  
Finally, the model is estimated equation by equation. As Baltagi (1995) stated, 
even though the innovations may be contemporaneously correlated, this procedure is 
asymptotically efficient and joint estimation does not improve efficiency since the set 
of regressors is the same in each equation. 
 
4.2. Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
 
Estimated coefficients from the reduced form of the model above can be used to 
implement dynamic simulations by means of the generalised impulse response 
functions (GIRFs hereinafter), as described in Pesaran and Shin (1997). GIRFs measure 
the adjustment pattern of each endogenous variable in a dynamic system in reaction to 
a shock, which is either to itself or to any other endogenous variable. An initial 
advantage of these impulse response functions is that they take into account the 
historical observed distribution of the residuals, i.e. they do not analyse the effect of a 
shock on a variable assuming that the other variables remain constant, but rather 
consider the correlation between the endogenous variables of the system. Moreover, 
they overcome the main shortcoming of traditional ‘orthogonalized’ impulse response 
functions (Hamilton, 1994), as they are invariant to the ordering of the endogenous 
variables in the vector autoregressive model.  
Hence, denoting the known history of the economy up to time t-1 by Ωt-1  and letting  δj 
be the shock on the jth equation, the GIRF of Xt at horizon n is defined by 
 
                ( ) ( ) ( )111 |,|,, −+−+− Ω−Ω==Ω tnttjjtnttjx xEuxEnGIRF δδ               (5) 
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Note that this expression establishes that the GIRF for the endogenous variables vector 
xt, n periods ahead, is the difference in the expected value of xt+n when taking δj shock 
into account. As shown in Pesaran and Shin (1997), under the assumption of normally 
distributed errors, the scaled GIRF of the effect of one standard error shock to the jth 
equation at time t on xt+n is given by 
   
                                     ( ) jnjjgj eAn Σ= − 2/1σψ   n= 0, 1, 2,...                                    (6) 
 
 
where An denotes the MA coefficient matrix at t+n, ek is m x 1 the selection vector with 
unity as its kth element and zero elsewhere. 
 
5. Data 
5.1. The sample 
 
The previous specification (expression 3) was estimated using a wide dataset of 
Spanish municipalities covering the period 1994-200523. The first year (1994) was not 
selected randomly, but rather determined by data constraints, given that the data 
required to construct the urban sprawl variable was not available prior to this year.  
Nonetheless, the period of study is particularly relevant to the aim of this paper, since 
in the mid-90s the Spanish housing market started to recover, leading to a period of 
intense urban expansion that has driven the Spanish economy until recent years.  
 
Note that the analysis of the relationship between urban sprawl and budget 
variables must be conducted at the local level. This is because policy decisions 
concerning urban planning are taken principally by municipal governments, while  
sprawl affects the revenues and expenditures that fall primarily under the control of 
local authorities. Moreover, as Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989) and Dahlberg and Johansson 
(1998) point out, the availability of budget data at the local level represents an 
improvement with respect to earlier studies where national data had to be used and 
avoids our having to deal with stabilisation and aggregation problems. In the first 
instance, cyclical adjustments had to be made to take into account the stabilization 
activity in which the central government was involved, while in the second, the 
                                                 
23 Note that, since the panel has only 12 years of data, conclusions cannot be drawn regarding 
long-run budget dynamics but it is possible to analyse the short-term effects of sprawl shocks. 
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analysis of local government behaviour via national data obviously added an 
aggregation problem to the estimation.  
 
Next we briefly describe the variables included in the model. Descriptive 
statistics and definitions are provided in Table 2. 
 
5.2. Budget variables  
 
Spanish local budgets are classified in terms of revenues and expenditures 
sections (see Table 1). Here, the budget variables have been constructed similarly in 
accordance with the nature of revenues and expenditures, using the data provided by 
the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance. Hence, Current Expenditures (CEit) are 
defined as the sum of expenditures on public wages, the purchase of goods and 
services, debt service and current transfers, and Capital Expenditures (KEit) as the sum 
of real investments and capital transfers. On the revenues side, we consider Current 
Transfers (CTit), Capital Transfers (KTit), Tax Revenues (TRit) - including direct and 
indirect taxes as well as user charges, and Development Revenues (DRit), defined as the 
sum of revenues from the sales of public land, asset revenues and all taxes associated 
with building (planning permissions, construction taxes and taxes on land value 
improvements). Note that this last variable includes revenues that might be considered 
as being more closely linked to the real estate cycle (and as such they are highly 
volatile), regardless of the current revenues status of some of them. All budget 
variables have been deflated using the regional Consumer Price Index and are 
expressed in per capita terms24.  
The use of more accurately defined budget variables is essential here, since the 
standard aggregation of budget data implemented in studies elsewhere might well result 
in misleading interpretations of our results, especially on the revenues side. To date, 
current and capital revenues, which respectively include own revenues and current 
transfers, and public land sales and capital transfers, have been considered. Thus, a 
positive impact of urban sprawl on current revenues can be interpreted as follows: this 
spatially expansive urban development pattern increases the ability of municipal 
authorities to generate revenues, but at the same time it requires higher levels of 
government to cover their additional costs by increasing transfers to municipalities. 
                                                 
24 Both the Consumer Price Index and population data have been obtained from the Spanish 
National Statistics Institute. The latter corresponds to the Population Census undertaken at the 
beginning of each year. 
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Similarly, higher levels of capital revenues in cities with greater urban sprawl can be 
explained as the additional revenues generated by urban expansion, as well as being the 
result of higher capital transfers from upper tiers of government to growing 
municipalities. Therefore, these definitions needed be modified to enhance their 
precision.   
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition 
    
NFDit -8.369 154.365 CDit – KDit 
CDit -0.109 110.878  CEit – TXit – CTit 
   CEit 444.948 209.478  Sections I, II, III, IV of Expenditure Budget 
   TXit 243.219 163.394 Sections I, II and III of Revenue Budget (minus URit) 
   CTit 201.797 104.572 Section  IV of Revenue Budget 
KDit -8.259 168.503 KEit – KTit – URit 
   KEit 269.862 334.336  Sections VI and VII of Expenditure Budget 
   KTit 164.293 292.395  Section VII of Revenue Budget 
   DRit 113.842 155.692  Sub-sections 1.1.4, 2.8.2, 3.6, 3.9, and Sections V and 
VI of Revenue Budget 
Sprawlit 224.115 140.738 Built-up area per capita 
      
Notes: (a) The definition of the fiscal variables is based on the economic classification of the 
Spanish budget by sections (see Table 1). (b) All budget variables are deflated using the 
regional Consumer Price Index, expressed in € 2005 and scaled in terms of population size. 
(c) Sprawl variable is measured in per capita square metres. 
Sources: Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance, Spanish National Statistics Institute 
and Spanish Property Assessment Office.  
 
5.3. Urban Sprawl variable 
 
Obtaining a reliable specification of urban sprawl is complicated by both the lack of 
consensus as to its definition and obvious data constraints. Thus, most empirical studies 
use variants of population density to measure sprawl (see Ladd, 1992). Yet, this single 
measure, while easy to compute, might not be sufficiently informative to describe the 
full spatial dimension of urban sprawl. For this reason, some researchers have sought to 
introduce additional measures so as to characterize more fully this particular pattern of 
urban development (see, for instance, Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2003, 2008; Burchfield 
et al., 2006). 
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In line with the literature, urban sprawl is considered here as a growth pattern that is 
characterized by the excessive spatial expansion of urban land. Indeed, sprawl reflects 
the over-consumption of land per person rather than simple urban expansion or 
population growth and, hence, it is proxied here using a density variable (defined as 
sprawlit) that represents per capita built-up area. Note that a consideration of 
administrative boundaries as the definition of consumed land area is not particularly 
useful as the municipal limits may include a large amount of vacant land or even non-
developable land. The only way to obtain a meaningful measure of density requires 
using the built-up area devoted to urban activities25. Note also that, as explained in 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2008), total municipal land area is held constant, so the 
percentage of local land area that is developed measures the spatial extent of 
development or, in other words, the horizontal dimension of sprawl. 
 
6. Estimation results 
In this section we present the estimation results for the specification given by 
expression (3).   
 
6.1. Model specification 
 
Before estimating the model, it is important to verify its proper specification in 
terms of optimal lag length. To do so, and adopting a general-to-specific approach, we 
selected a sufficient lag length to ensure there was no serial correlation in the error 
terms of the first-differenced equations26. In line with previous studies (see Holtz-Eakin 
et al., 1989, Dahlberg and Johansson, 1998, 2000) we initiated the analysis with a 
                                                 
25 In Spain, urbanized land is defined as the total amount of land that is legally recognized as 
having been developed or which is available for development in each municipality. As such it 
includes both the built-up and the non built-up areas available for construction purposes. The 
use of data on built-up area represents an improvement with respect to previous studies where 
total urbanized land is used instead, and has been obtained from the Spanish Property 
Assessment Office. Unfortunately, there is no data available for other measures (including 
percentage of residential houses, percentage of scattered population or number of population 
centres per municipality) for the whole period considered. Thus, per capita built-up area remains 
the only data source currently available for comparing land use patterns across the country as a 
whole. 
26  The tests for serial correlation are provided by the m1 and m2 statistics developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). The residuals in 
levels must be uncorrelated, which implies that those in the first-differenced equation can 
exhibit serial correlation of order one but not of order two. In other words, an AR(1) process is 
expected in the first-differenced residuals since Δuit=uit-ui,t-1 and Δui,t-1=ui,t-1-ui,t-2 share a 
common term, ui,t-1. By contrast, an AR(2) process indicates autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals, since ui,t-1 from Δuit=uit-ui,t-1 and  ui,t-2 from Δui,t-2=ui,t-2-ui,t-3 are related. In 
practice, m1 is expected to be significant but not m2. 
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three-year dynamic process and then tested for a possible reduction in the number of 
lags in all the equations simultaneously.   
As the results in Table 3 show, we found first-, though not second-, order correlation in 
the residuals from the first-differenced equations, indicating that there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals in levels27.  
 
Once the model has been correctly specified, the next step involves testing the 
possibility of shortening the lag length, by excluding one lag at a time from all 
regressors. As noted in Dahlberg and Johansson (2000), this can be achieved by 
initiating a sequential procedure by means of the difference-Hansen statistic (see also 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). This statistic is computed as the difference between the 
values of the Hansen test in both the restricted and the unrestricted models28. Results 
are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 3. Autocorrelation Tests for the initial model specification. p=3, N=1,120, 
T=12 (1994-2005) 
 m1 m2  
Sprawlit -2.88 [0.004] 0.31 [0.755]  
CEit -1.58 [0.115] 0.19 [0.852]  
TXit -0.93 [0.354] -1.69 [0.091]  
CTit -1.39 [0.163] -0.57 [0.570]  
KEit -3.68 [0.000] 1.63 [0.103]  
KTit -4.82 [0.000] -0.35 [0.729]  
DRit -1.23 [0.219] -1.66 [0.100]  
Note: Results obtained after one-step system-GMM estimation using asymptotic 
values. P-values in parentheses. m1 and m2 are the Arellano-Bond tests for AR(1) 
and AR(2) processes in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 We expect an AR(1) process in the first-differenced residuals since Δuit=uit-ui,t-1 and Δui,t-1 
=ui,t-1-ui,t-2 share a common term, ui,t-1. 
28The Hansen test is an overidentifying restrictions test provided after system-GMM estimation.  
Under the null of valid instruments, the test is asymptotically χ2-distributed with k-n degrees of 
freedom, where k is the number of instruments and n is the number of estimated parameters (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano, 2003). Thus, the difference-Hansen statistic is 
asymptotically χ2-distributed with mR-mU degrees of freedom, where mR and mU are the degrees 
of freedom of the restricted and the unrestricted model, respectively. Note that the restricted 
model is the one with the longer lag length, since using more instruments is equivalent to 
imposing more assumptions (in terms of moment conditions) while in the unrestricted model 
only a subset of instruments is used. 
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The p-value of the difference-Hansen statistic indicates that the model can be shortened 
to two lags but not any further29. Hence, the equations for the model considered here 
require a specification with only two lags in order to capture the whole dynamics of the 
process. 
 
Table 4. Reduction of lag length: p=3, N=1,120, T=12 (1994-2005) 
Equation Lag reduction Difference-Hansen statistic 
Sprawlit 3 → 2 2.98 [0.3947]  
 2 → 1 2.17 [0.5378]  
CEit 3 → 2 3.76 [0.5844]  
 2 → 1 15.35 [0.0177]  
TXit 3 → 2 12.96 [0.075]  
 2 → 1 20.08 [0.0012]  
CTit 3 → 2 1.22 [0.7482]  
 2 → 1 8.77 [0.0325]  
KEit 3 → 2 1.96 [0.1615]  
 2 → 1 24.3 [0.0020]  
KTit 3 → 2 9.93 [0.6221]  
 2 → 1 19.03 [0.0399]  
URit 3 → 2 10.75 [0.1499]  
 2 → 1 30.76 [0.0001]  
Note: p-values in parentheses.    
 
6.2. Response of budget variables to a sprawl shock  
 
Note that the reduced form depicted in equation (3) is a pure forecast model, as it is a 
reflection of the true but unknown structural model. This implies refraining from the 
analysis of individual coefficients after system-GMM estimation since neither their 
sign nor their magnitude has any causal interpretation in a vector autoregressive context 
(i.e. the lagged effects of a particular variable tell us nothing about their 
contemporaneous correlation)30.  
 
                                                 
29 The Sprawl equation could be reduced to one lag, but this would imply serial correlation. For 
this reason we do not reduce the model specification to one lag. 
30 The estimation was performed using one step system-GMM estimation, given that the two-
step estimated standard error tends to be downward biased and, hence, unreliable (see Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2008). Note also that a correction to the standard errors 
was applied. The set of equations included in the model passed both the autocorrelation tests 
and the test for the validity of instruments. Estimation results are shown in the Appendix. 
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However, the estimation of a vector autoregressive model does provide us with certain 
insights into local government behaviour and the adjustment pattern of all municipal 
budget components to a shock in the sprawl equation by means of the computed 
GIRFs31. These are summarized in terms of average responses at present values32 and 
are shown in Table 5. Note that each row describes the impact of one standard error 
shock on the sprawl equation for each local budget component (in 2005 € per capita). 
Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis of these results. 
  
First, urban sprawl generates both a current and a capital surplus in the short-run, which 
tend to disappear over time, although only the former was found to be statistically 
significant. More specifically, one standard deviation of sprawl (which represents 141 
per capita square metres and about a 60% increase in Spanish average sprawl levels33) 
generates a current surplus and a capital surplus of 5.26 and 8.02 € per capita, 
respectively. Second, sprawl leads to a considerable increase in current expenditures. In 
fact, when a municipality undergoes urban sprawl, local politicians extend public goods 
and services to the new developments located at the urban fringe, leading to an increase 
in local current expenditure. However, this increase in current expenditures is offset to 
a slightly greater extent by increases in current revenues (other than those associated 
with building), which in this instance are mainly operating transfers. Specifically, one 
standard deviation shock to sprawl leads to an increase in current expenditures of 5.89 
€, an increase in tax revenues of 5.22 € and an increase in current transfers of 5.93 €, all 
in per capita terms. In other words, a 60% increase in sprawl increases current 
expenditures, tax revenues and current grants, on average, by 1.32%, 2.15% and 2.94%, 
respectively. Third, the impact of sprawl on capital spending was particularly high, 
with a 60% increase in sprawl resulting in a 6.7% increase in capital expenditures. This 
result suggests that the sprawled growth of cities requires heavy investment in 
infrastructure to maintain a given level of provision of public goods and services for all 
residents in a jurisdiction. Note that these findings are in line with those obtained in 
Hortas-Rico and Solé-Ollé (2010) who provide evidence of the additional costs 
generated by the spatially expansive growth of Spanish municipalities. More 
                                                 
31 According to the empirical literature, the estimation of a micro panel vector autoregressive 
model of this type requires computing the GIRFs for a short reaction period (7 years in our 
case). For a robustness check, longer time horizons were applied yielding similar results. The 
bootstrapped standard errors of the GIRFs were computed by conducting 500 replications with 
replacement. Then, the 5th and 95th percentiles of this distribution were used as confidence 
intervals for the impulse responses.  
32 The discount tax rate was fixed at 3%. 
33 The mean and standard deviation of all variables are shown in Table 2. 
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specifically, their findings suggest that, among all the public services analysed, the 
greatest costs are those incurred from extending roads and basic infrastructure to new 
housing developments34. 
 
Table 5. Present value of GIRFs 
 Innovation to sprawl 
Response of (absolute values) 
CD                -5.26 [1,42]*** 
CE 5.89 [0.79]*** 
TX 5.22  [0.57]*** 
CT  5.93   [1.01]*** 
KD                   -8.02 [7,85] 
KE 18.09 [6.41]*** 
KT 15.68 [3.97]*** 
UR 10.44 [1.47]*** 
NFD+                -13.27 [7,96]* 
Sprawl                    26.47 [3.07]*** 
Notes: (i) Bootstrapped standard errors shown in brackets: 1000 
replications with replacement; (ii) ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively; 
(iii) CD, KD and NFD have been computed manually according to 
expression (2). 
 
Yet, capital grants from upper tiers of government and development revenues increase 
in order to meet the new demands for infrastructure (by 15.68 and 10.44 € per capita, 
respectively, which represent about a 10% increase in average values for both budget 
components) resulting in a capital surplus of 8.02 € per capita. Thus, these results show 
that development revenues play an important role in covering the extra capital 
expenditures generated by new infrastructure needs. In other words, this urban 
development pattern increases the ability of municipal authorities to generate revenues 
(through construction taxes, planning permits and taxes on land value improvements, 
among others). However, these revenues, which can be immediately generated, do not 
cover all additional facilities and infrastructure needs so that eventually grant financing 
is also required for the adjustment. 
                                                 
34 A 1% increase in sprawl raises Basic Infrastructures and Transportation costs by 0.28%, 
Community facilities costs by 0.11%, Local police costs by 0.10%, Housing and community 
development costs by 0.08%, Culture and sports costs by 0.17% and General administration 
costs by 0.12%. A simulation exercise conducted by the authors showed that the average 
increase in sprawl during the period analyzed was about 40%, which resulted in a 2% increase 
approximately in Spain’s local current costs and a 7% increase in the country’s infrastructure 
costs. When considering the smaller sample of 1,033 municipalities used in the present paper, 
rather than the complete set of 7,300 local governments, this impact stood at 1.6% and 4.7%, 
respectively.  
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Overall, it can be concluded that development revenues, in addition to both current and 
capital grants from upper tiers of government, play an important role in the adjustment 
process initiated by municipalities to urban sprawl shocks. Thus, local governments 
undergoing urban expansion rely heavily on grant financing and immediately relevant 
revenues from building activity to cover the sizeable investments required by new 
housing developments located at the urban fringe. 
 
6.4. Fiscal adjustment: city size and the initial level of sprawl. 
 
The analysis up to this point has assumed that all Spanish municipalities follow a 
common fiscal adjustment process in response to an urban sprawl shock. However, 
cities will behave differently in line with specific municipal characteristics, including 
population size and the initial level of sprawl35. Thus, the typically weaker financial 
situation described for smaller municipalities might encourage them to rely more 
heavily on sprawl as a funding tool, while it is probable that municipalities which 
experienced major land-use changes at the beginning of the 90s will continue to sprawl 
more readily than their more compact counterparts. 
 
Hence, we decided to perform further estimations on subsamples of the 
municipalities. First, we estimated the model separately for large and small cities. In 
order to ensure a reasonable number in each group, the sample was split into two 
population categories, below and above 5,000 inhabitants, containing 329 and 704 
observations, respectively36. In the case of the impact of a sprawl shock on the current 
deficit and its components, the results were largely similar to those presented above. By 
contrast, the impact of sprawl on the capital deficit components was considerably 
higher in small cities. As reported in Table 6, the investment needs of small 
municipalities resulting from urban expansion more than double those encountered in 
big cities. Moreover, small cities are much more reliant on development revenues and 
transfers from higher tiers of government to finance the investment needs generated by 
sprawl.  
 
 
                                                 
35 The variables were chosen so that no correlation existed between them. 
36  Note that this division is in keeping with the allocation of responsibilities to the 
municipalities provided for under Spanish law. Thus, in small cities only the provision of basic 
services is compulsory, while in the larger ones a number of other responsibilities are included. 
See Section 3 for further details. 
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Table 6. Present value of GIRFs 
   
(i) Subsamples according to city size 
   
 
Municipalities with 
population <5,000 
inhabitants 
Municipalities with 
population >5,000 
inhabitants 
Response of Innovation to sprawl  
CD+      -5.51 [1.40]***     -5.07 [1.22]*** 
   CE   7.09 [0.89]***     5.30 [0.70]*** 
   TX   4.92 [0.34]***     4.79 [0.59]*** 
   CT    7.67 [1.02]***      5.59 [0.81]*** 
KD      -8.60 [10.32]     -5.28 [1.58]*** 
   KE 17.87 [9.18]*      6.69 [0.90]*** 
   KT     14.03 [3.81]***     6.28 [0.77]*** 
   UR     12.45 [1.68]***     5.68 [1.02]*** 
NFD+     -14.11 [10.41] -10.35 [1.98]*** 
   
(ii) Subsamples according to initial level of sprawl 
   
 
Municipalities with initial 
sprawl <200 pc square 
metres 
Municipalities with 
initial sprawl >200 pc 
square metres 
Response of Innovation to sprawl  
CD+     -3.40 [2.09]*     -6.81 [6.89] 
   CE 5.28 [1.25]***    8.55 [3.64]* 
   TX 2.92 [0.54]***     6.31 [0.86]** 
   CT 5.76 [1.52]*** 9.05 [5.56] 
KD      -9.65 [7.37]    -11.02 [128.85] 
   KE  14.41 [3.80]***   23.99 [22.61] 
   KT  16.40 [6.01]***     19.78 [132.72] 
   UR 7.65 [1.75]***    15.23 [7.28]* 
NFD+     -13.05 [7.68]*    -17.82 [128.92] 
      
Notes: (i) Bootstrapped standard errors shown in brackets: 1000 replications with 
replacement; (ii) ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 
99, 95 and 91% levels; (iii) CD, KD and NFD have been computed manually 
according to expression (2). 
 
Finally, we estimated the model for two groups of municipalities based on their 
initial level of sprawl. We determined a cut-off point around the average level of sprawl 
in the sample, while ensuring (as above) a reasonable number of observations in both 
new sub-samples. Thus, we ended up with 569 and 464 municipalities with initial 
sprawl levels below and above 200 square metres per capita of built-up area, 
respectively. The adjustment recorded in local budgets was quantitatively higher 
(although in most instances not statistically significant) in those cities where urban 
sprawl was evident from the beginning of the period. More specifically, in cities that 
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had already undergone urban sprawl and which continued to expand during the 90s, the 
impact on urban revenues doubled that recorded in their more compact counterparts. 
 
Generally speaking, however, these results confirmed the findings for the entire sample 
presented in the previous section. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 This study has sought to provide insights into the relationship between urban 
sprawl and municipal budgets by analysing how local government budgets adjust to a 
change in the urban development pattern. Thus, the study has drawn on a broad panel 
dataset from 4,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 1994-2005 to estimate a panel 
vector autoregressive model. The modelling approach adopted here has enabled us to 
investigate how each individual budget component adjusts to an urban sprawl shock by 
means of Generalised Impulse Response Functions.  
 
The model specified includes capital and current deficit as well as an inverse 
measure of population density to proxy urban sprawl. The two budget components have 
been disaggregated into six different variables (current expenditures, tax revenues, 
operating grants, capital expenditures, capital transfers and development revenues) so 
as to examine how the individual components of local budgets adjust to changes in 
local urban development patterns.  
 
The GIRF results show that the sprawl of cities produces both a current and a 
capital surplus leading to an overall non-financial surplus for local governments 
(although only the former was found to be statistically significant). This was 
particularly marked in the case of small cities and municipalities that had already 
undergone considerable urban expansion in the mid-90s. 
 
The results record an increase in current expenditures, suggesting that local politicians 
will provide additional public goods and services for new housing developments. 
Moreover, urban sprawl is associated with large investment requirements as roads and 
basic infrastructures are extended for the new residents located at the urban fringe. 
Most of the adjustments to a sprawl shock are borne by upper tiers of government via 
grant financing (principally capital transfers) together with the not insignificant role 
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played by the revenues associated with the real estate cycle itself (tax on land use 
improvements, building permits, construction taxes, public land sales, etc.). 
 
However, the over-reliance of municipalities on grants to make adjustments to their 
budgets highlights a potential moral-hazard problem. Additional infrastructure 
requirements associated by spatially expansive growth are funded in the main by upper 
tiers of government, encouraging municipalities to promote urban expansion without 
necessarily considering the full fiscal consequences of such policies. Here, this problem 
could be due to the design of Spain’s grant system, since some capital transfers are 
dependent on the municipalities’ infrastructure deficit, which in turn is usually induced 
by urban growth. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Detailed estimation results, p=2, n=1,033, T=12 
 CEit TXit CTit KEit KTit URit SPRAWLit 
CE it-1 
0.894** 
[0.356] 
0.095** 
[0.045] 
-0.005 
[0.072] 
0.076 
[0.176] 
-0.061 
[0.105] 
0.209* 
[0.124] 
-0.004 
[0.003] 
CE it-2 
0.051* 
[0.215] 
0.053*** 
[0.012] 
0.032 
[0.029] 
-0.095 
[0.122] 
-0.088 
[0.070] 
0.087** 
[0.043] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
TX it-1 
-0.014  
[0.123] 
0.344 
[0.217] 
-0.012 
[0.038] 
0.149 
[0.192] 
0.161 
[0.108] 
-0.061 
[0.057] 
-0.013** 
[0.005] 
TX it-2 
0.047  
[0.039] 
0.463** 
[0.161] 
-0.014 
[0.014] 
-0.138 
[0.129] 
-0.056 
[0.082] 
-0.092 
[0.080] 
0.003 
[0.006] 
CT it-1 
0.041  
[0.164] 
-0.074** 
[0.027] 
0.675** 
[0.225] 
-0.123 
[0.247] 
0.113 
[0.100] 
-0.179** 
[0.084] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
CT it-2 
-0.019  
[0.020] 
-0.047** 
[0.017] 
0.223 
[0.151] 
0.285*** 
[0.108] 
0.211** 
[0.074] 
-0.106** 
[0.044] 
0.001 
[0.003] 
KE it-1 
-0.009  
[0.034] 
0.029* 
[0.012] 
-0.013 
[0.023] 
0.678 
[0.479] 
-0.353* 
[0.200] 
0.113 
[0.082] 
0.001 
[0.002] 
KE it-2 
0.019  
[0.020] 
0.026** 
[0.010] 
0.004 
[0.009] 
0.121** 
[0.051] 
0.078* 
[0.042] 
0.019 
[0.019] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
KT it-1 
-0.0004  
[0.025] 
-0.030 
[0.013] 
0.024 
[0.022] 
-0.185 
[0.453] 
0.862*** 
[0.263] 
-0.074 
[0.074] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
KT it-2 
-0.012  
[0.019] 
-0.031 
[0.010] 
0.004 
[0.011] 
0.209*** 
[0.052] 
0.252*** 
[0.050] 
-0.023 
[0.021] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
UR it-1 
-0.004  
[0.061] 
-0.021*** 
[0.008] 
0.003 
[0.023] 
-0.039 
[0.242] 
0.186* 
[0.110] 
0.164 
[0.242] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
UR it-2 
0.008  
[0.026] 
-0.013 
[0.010] 
-0.015 
[0.015] 
0.151* 
[0.086] 
0.082 
[0.061] 
0.347*** 
[0.096] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
Sprawl it-1 
0.053  
[0.143] 
0.141* 
[0.078] 
-0.055 
[0.052] 
0.473 
[0.374] 
0.553 
[0.345] 
0.103 
[0.163] 
1.457*** 
[0.179] 
Sprawl it-2 
-0.060 
[0.151] 
-0.126* 
[0.075] 
0.038 
[0.054] 
-0.371 
[0.378] 
-0.479 
[0.354] 
-0.038 
[0.162] 
-0.450** 
[0.182] 
m1 -2.23** -2.07** -2.67*** -3.95*** -5.82*** -1.95* -4.58*** 
m2 0.30 -1.38 0.10 0.49 -0.16 -1.41 1.65 
Hansen test 17.14 14.25* 16.38 32.38 50.63* 28.65 14.61 
        
 Notes: (i) Estimation results after system-gmm estimation, including individual and time effects in all 
equations. (ii) Heteroskedasticity standard errors in brackets. (iii) ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant coefficients at the 99, 95 and 91% levels. (iv) m1 and m2 are the Arellano’s AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests for autocorrelation while the Hansen test checks for the validity of the instruments used in 
the estimation procedure (see Section 5.1. for further details). (v) All equations pass both the 
autocorrelation tests and the test for overidentifying restrictions with the exception of the TX and KT 
equations, where the null of valid instruments is rejected at 10%. However, these results should be 
interpreted with caution since, as noted in Dahlberg and Johansson (2000), estimation techniques that 
are generally adopted tend to reject too often a true null of validity of instruments (type I error).  
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